The Discourse and Epistemology of Ideas: The Role of Metaphors
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ABSTRACT

The idea of ideas is potentially an illusive language claim. Whether as a word, as a concept, it implies an existential phenomenon which raises epistemological issues of how language shapes what we believe we know. The delineation and explication of ideas requires an examination of the roles of metaphor in such discourse. Considered from a cross-cultural perspective the fact that the concept idea recurs in various languages suggests at least a functional need as a reality creating device, a linguistic tool in the explications of our social discourses but an analysis of the underlying metaphoric patterns reveal significant divergences of intent in their use.

An examination of the systems of our epistemologies of knowledge both historically and in contemporary discourse leads to an analysis of metaphoric patterns and the schema derived from underlying conceptual metaphors (Lakoff, Johnson, Gibbs, Goatly, et al.) in the social constructions we make. A cross-cultural perspective on the conceptual metaphors utilized provides insight into value structures and reveals culturally dependent structures and associated values in shaping our understanding of human and natural sciences in the building of models to give coherence to our understanding. Culture-based perspectives of social realities differ because they embody a variety of underlying conceptual or root metaphors. This leads to a re-examination of the implications of linguistic relativity (Wm. Von Humboldt, Sapir, Whorf with Cartesian rationalism).

To investigate these potentially divergent patterns of thought with their differing assumptions about creating understanding, a conceptual metaphoric analysis (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff and Turner, 1989; Gibbs, 1994; Goatly, 1997) of contemporary English and Japanese discourse on expressing "ideas/kangae" was made. The discourse data were analyzed into eleven underlying metaphoric or conceptual patterns. E.g. IDEAS ARE FOOD, IDEAS ARE COMMODITIES, IDEAS ARE PATHS. The expressions in the data related to the key terms of IDEAS and KANGAE were collated from genre such as psychology, philosophy, cognitive linguistics, language learning, and reference works.

While the eleven underlying patterns were found in both English and Japanese discourse, four cross-cultural semantic relationships were also examined: (1) essentially the same in form and meaning; (2) similar in form but different in meaning; (3) different in form but similar in intent; (4) miscellaneous items different in form and meaning (linguistically and semantically distinct). The degree of commonality in the conceptual metaphoric usage between the two languages was generally low with only one pattern showing a high degree of congruency. These divergences bring us to the conflicts in epistemologies which have historically shaped our discourses in the sciences and humanities in positivistic or phenomenological modes and bring us to the diversity of conceptualization patterns and schema which we use to bring order into our experiences and understanding.

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Introduction

The idea of ideas is an illusive language claim. As a word, as a concept, as a delineation and explication of what we want to conceptualize, it implies an existential phenomenon. Considered from a cross-cultural perspective in various languages the fact that it recurs in various discourses suggests at least a functional need as a reality creating device. Idea can be seen as a linguistic tool in the explications of our discourses on whatever topics we choose to focus on.

Even a cursory examination of a dictionary’s definitions (Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, 2003) and the representative expressions used in the related discourse, which the lexicographers have mined, will lead us to metaphoric language necessary to grasp this phenomenon. The language used in the English discourse on expressing ideas has underlying it conceptual metaphoric patterns, such as IDEAS ARE ENTITIES or things, objects, as represented in the following list. We can give and get, quantify, exchange, play with ideas as entities and even conceptualize them as specific entities such as a toy or a bullet. What on the surface seem to be simply ordinary expressions or even idiomatic in nature have underlying them broader metaphoric patterns, which generate schema for the social construction of reality.

have an idea
get an idea
give someone an idea
be full of ideas
bursting with ideas
exchange/share ideas
toy with ideas
fire ideas off each other
come up with an idea

The aim of this paper is to make a conceptual metaphoric analysis of the contemporary discourse on the expression of ideas in English and Japanese. This will elicit insight not only into cross-cultural issues but also have implications for the epistemology of knowledge. The underlying metaphoric analysis is based upon the work in conceptual metaphors by George Lakoff, et al. (1980, 1987, 1989). An excursion into aspects of the epistemology of knowledge in the history of Western thought is intended to highlight implications from Contemporary Theory of Metaphor on the structure
and function of underlying metaphorical patterns on how we conceive our knowledge, scientific and humanistic, how we delineate our semantic space.

In their book *Metaphors We Live By*, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980) make the claim that most of language is metaphoric in nature. They argue that a "concept is metaphorically structured, the activity is metaphorically structured, and consequently the language is metaphorically structured" (3). This perspective about how we conceptually shape the representations in our discourses has implications for the epistemology of knowledge in the sciences and humanities as well as how the use of metaphorical language undergirds our model making and shaping our discourses about them. In this paper I will first examine the history of our pursuit of knowing and then examine the current language use in the discourse on *ideas* in English and Japanese to see how the conceptualization reflects cross-cultural commonality and potential misconstrual of meaning. As a linguistic entity *idea* is an illusive conceptual tool, but how does the discourse used to explicate or shape the meanings expressed take on specificity? The underlying metaphorical patterns developed by Lakoff, Johnson, Turner, Gibbs, Goatsly provide insight and contribute to understanding the models, the systems of our epistemologies of knowledge.

The schema derived from the underlying conceptual metaphors are the genesis for social construction of reality. They are performed in society and connected to cultural mores, social roles and personal scripts. They provide the plots of life, the enactment of social drama and the frames of our sense of life. They also generate sub-metaphors, such as when the metaphor for growth developed into the metaphor of progress. And importantly for cognitive scientists, schemas provide the basis upon which derivative forms or systems of knowledge are generated.

Metaphors provide an important role in the understanding of cross-cultural systems. They enable us to gain significant insights into the value structures of other traditions. This role of metaphor in revealing cultural structures and in explicating their associated values within an epistemological system has been examined by Robert Sr. Clair (2006). In order to review these relationships, it is necessary to look at related fields of thought with polar distinctions such as the contrast between dialectics versus rhetoric, the opposition of human sciences and natural sciences, the antithesis between the sociology of knowledge versus Cartesian methodology. This background will lead us to a discussion of the Neo-Humboldtian origins of Sapir's model of epistemology and the linguistic relativity hypothesis in linguistic anthropology. The Cartesian assumptions underlying the cognitive model of the Expressibility Hypothesis also will be critically reviewed.
What is significant about these various systems of Western thought is that they each provide different frameworks for the understanding of the role of metaphor in language. Each epistemological system makes substantially different claims about the nature and use of metaphor in language. St. Clair (2006) has argued that many scholarly criticisms of metaphor by linguists (Kittay, 1989; Sacks, 1978), psychologists (Pollio, 1972), philosophers (Henle, 1958), anthropologists (Sapir and Crocker, 1977) and literary critics (Richards, 1936) have missed the crucial fact that metaphors are used along with other figures of speech (simile, metonymy, synecdoche, irony, hyperbole, oxymorons) when advocating or explaining a new system of epistemological framework (critical philosophy, hermeneutics in human sciences) within another older established system of thought (analytical philosophy, positivism) in Western thought. There have been exceptions such as philosophers of language (Black, 1962; Johnson, 1987), some social psychologists (Shank and Abelson, 1977) and sociologists (Richard Brown, 1977). Underlying all these models is the distinction between self-contained (closed) rhetorical systems and evolving or changing dialectical (open) systems.

Rhetoric versus Dialectics

Most systems of thought are self-contained models. They present a view of the world from a certain perspective and they systematically exclude alternative mentalities. Richard Brown (A Poetics for Sociology, chapter 4), who is a sociological theorist, argues that this fact simply reiterates the claim that all models of knowledge are metaphorical. Brown’s argument that theoretical models are essentially metaphors lies in the concept of metaphor itself. A metaphor is, after all, seeing something from a viewpoint. It is a frame of vision. Since models are ways of seeing a body of knowledge from a certain viewpoint or theoretical framework, the model is consequently metaphorical.

Metaphors provide the key to model building. Following Richard Brown, it can be said that they begin within a discipline as illustrative devices. Through the use of a new term or lexical connotation, the framework of the old system is shifted or transferred to a new perspective or context. When physicists, for example, used the idea of the solar system as the basis for their new model of the atom, they were using an "illustrative metaphor." The new model (the concept of the atom) was based on an analogy to another model (the concept of the solar system). Once scientists accepted this new
perspective and its corresponding figures of speech, they continued to elaborate on the details and so expanded their knowledge base. The result of this additive process is the eventual arrival of an iconic model. As the details within the new system continue to proliferate, the remaining options for exploratory research are greatly narrowed. Brown argues that the "illustrative metaphor" then becomes an "iconic metaphor." Some metaphors are so well accepted that with the passing of time they become entrenched within their own cultural framework as tacit knowledge, a Zeitgeist. In his own field of sociology, Brown notes five principal or root metaphors for understanding "society":

Society seen as an organism
Society seen as a machine
Society seen as a social drama
Society seen as a game
Social conduct seen as language behavior

Cultures differ, it can be argued, because they embody different root metaphors. These underlying cultural paradigms usually become so embedded within the social history of a people that they provide a background of tacit knowledge, framing belief systems and also a plethora of social scripts or role behaviors on how to perform in public. Brown also argues that scientific revolutions are metaphorical shifts and that the implications of these shifts constitute a transition from dialectics to rhetoric. Richard Brown (A Poetics for Sociology, chapter 4) essentially re-examines Kuhn's model of scientific revolutions. What Kuhn saw as normal science, he argues is an iconic metaphor. What Kuhn discusses as the paradigm of revolutionary science he views as an illustrative metaphor. Rhetoric articulates the structures of the status quo, the established frameworks within a society. Dialectics has to do with the imposition of a new system of thought upon the older established one.

It is interesting to note that teachers of rhetoric appear often unaware of this distinction, especially when they discuss the use of invention as being equivalent to critical thinking. Invention has to do with the use of a system to arrive at new products, reports, discussions, etc., while critical thinking is dialectical and attempts to replace the older system with a new one. From that perspective, teachers of English are protectors of the status quo; they teach convention and form. Even when teaching "creative writing" they, more often than not, adhere to formula and conventional expectations.
Richard Brown (1987) is well aware of the conventional nature of rhetoric when he argues that “society is a text,” a self-contained system which harbors a certain mainstream perspective. The functioning of society is thus rhetorical in that it operates on the organization of recipes of public knowledge which has been made legitimate by a ruling social metaphor.

To speak about a new way of doing things, innovators are forced to coin many new terms or to use old ones in a new sense. For example, when Martin Heidegger (1962) challenged the rhetorical models of philosophy with his new existential framework, he found the contemporary language of philosophy to be inadequate. To express his ideas adequately, he found it necessary to resort to the original etymological meanings underlying the ordinary and commonplace nomenclature of philosophy. The model he advocated was pre-Socratic. It was Pythagorean in nature. What was most revealing in his quest for a new system was his insights into the Greek language and how its basic concepts were changed in translation into Latin. The Greeks perceived knowledge in terms of vision. They witnessed events and reported what they witnessed to others who understood the event as it was uncovered before their eyes. The words for “theory” theoria, witnessing teatos, the event theatros, the unveiling of the event or truth aletheia are all etymologically connected in the Greek world to seeing. In Latin, however, knowledge is to be found in metaphors where it is grasped comprehendere and collected intelligere and stored for later distribution, implying that knowledge is an entity. The harvest of knowledge is characteristically a Latin concept. What is important about differences in epistemes or mentalities is that when Greek concepts were translated into Latin, they were distorted by the new framework and resulted in a new rhetoric of motives. For those who spoke Latin, the Greek language and its vocabulary were decidedly metaphorical. For those who spoke Greek, the Latin way of speaking about knowledge was also metaphorical. Only one who was familiar with both systems could readily understand that the problem was a dialectical one. It was a conflict of epistemologies.

Much confusion still exists on metaphor because many academic professionals only see language usage from their own perspective. They do not see another system with its own epistemes and its need for a separate nomenclature. The lack of a dialectical overview in which systems of language and thought co-exist rather than compete is the case in point. Similarly, in dealing with metaphors across cultures, it would be delusory to interpret one’s own culture and its models of knowledge as the sole basis for interpreting and understanding others or to degrade the other system of values as being
inferior. One does not, however, have to go to another culture in order to experience this condition of epistemological imperialism. One need only look at the role of natural sciences and technology in Western culture to understand how it distorts other models or metaphors of knowledge. The current dominance of the natural science model over the language of the humanities is important because many negative claims made about metaphor stem from natural scientists and social scientists who employ this model (psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists and linguists) in judging the language of the arts as being inferior to their own system of knowledge and its claims of reality and validity.

**Human Sciences versus Natural Sciences**

A person who was to effect a change in European thought was Henri de Saint-Simon, a wealthy entrepreneur with a vision to create a utopian society. He lived over a century ago and lived next to the then newly created l'ecole polytechnique in Paris where scholars were being trained in the applied sciences. He was instrumental in influencing the physicists, chemists and physiologists working there in his belief that physics, the queen of natural sciences, should be the constitutive model for all forms of social knowledge. This new intellectual order based on the metaphors of physics, he called positivism. It legitimated the use of the scientific method for all disciplines, stressing the methodology of empiricism, demanding quantitative analyses of data, and established a quest for mathematical universals and the ideal of scientific objectivity (Comte, 1953; Manuel, 1962). This epistemological framework focusing on entities and their relationships still dominates contemporary European and American thought and forms the foundation for much research in the natural and social sciences (H Ayck, 1952).

The school of positivism not only attracted some of the more notable French scientists of the time (Ampère, Buffon, Clairault, Comte, Enfantin, Fourier, Lagrange, Laplace, Lavoisier), it also spread to other European countries such as Germany (Euler, Alexander von Humboldt), and England (Buckle, Eliot, Lewes, Mill, Spencer). The discussion of French Positivism is relevant to cross-cultural metaphors and is related to the metaphor of Physics which has such prominence in Western thought. The metaphor of Physics has become the dominant root metaphor (Roger Brown) in the western world and merits the status of a cultural metaphor. In English, for example, the word *science* has lost its original meaning of a body of knowledge which
it had in the Latin scientia. Today "science" is automatically understood to mean "natural science". In German, the original meaning of science as a body of knowledge is still retained in the term Die Wissenschaft and the natural sciences Die Naturwissenschaft is not the unmarked category, if we compare it to the human sciences, Geisteswissenschaft. The reason for this point is that perspectives which adhere to the rhetoric of the natural sciences are legitimated as normal but those which do not are interpreted as metaphorical. Hence, from the point of view of the positivistic norm of Western society, Asian concepts and values are seen as metaphorical or even mystical. But another related dichotomy which dominates western thought and that has filtered into the institutional thinking is the Arts versus the Sciences (Roger Brown, 1967), each of which views metaphors in radically different terms.

The German historiographer and philosopher, Wilhelm Dilthey, argued that the metaphor of physics may be adequate in dealing with physical objects, but it was inadequate as a model for the human sciences (Hodges, 1974). The mental life, he said, is radically different from the external perception of objects which constitute the physical sciences. The mental life requires inner perception and rests upon an awareness Inneworden, a lived experience Erleben, and is immediately given through intuition Anschauung. Dilthey saw history as the queen of the human sciences which he considered to be antithetical to physics and the natural sciences. In history the understanding Verstehen of an event as a pattern Gestalt is significant because such an event is interpreted in human terms within a cultural framework, but in physics the explanation Erklaerung of structures through description takes precedence over understanding. What is significant about the work of Dilthey is that it provided a valid critique against positivism and the controversy it raised still exists in contemporary epistemological research. Among persons heavily influenced by the works of Dilthey was Martin Heidegger (1962). He also argued against positivism which he perceived as entering a crisis because it failed to adequately consider questions of existence and essence. What this all means for the study of cultural metaphors is that there are two major epistemological paradigms in Western thought: the metaphor of physics Naturwissenschaft as the model for all knowledge and the metaphor of history as a special model for the humanities or human sciences Geisteswissenschaften. Each of these paradigms view metaphors in different ways. For the natural sciences, only metaphors of nature are deemed acceptable. For human sciences, it appears all metaphors are acceptable, except perhaps the prescriptions against dead and mixed metaphors.
Cultural Relativity and Humboldt’s Linguistics

The dichotomy discussed above can be found in the controversy over Benjamin Lee Whorf and the linguistic relativity hypothesis. Whorf was trained as a chemical engineer and after graduation he worked as an investigator for a fire insurance company. This took him to Arizona to investigate an extensive fire on the Hopi reservation. The different perception of the Hopi Aboriginals in interpreting a sign intrigued Whorf and he attributed their misunderstanding to the fact that they had a different linguistic system and therefore a different pattern of thought compared to that of the “Standard Average European” or Western thought. He argued that the world view Die Weltanschauung of the Hopis was substantially different. Whorf had been influenced by Edward Sapir whose approach to language and culture was more concomitant with phenomenology than with the positivistic underpinnings of American structuralism.

Within the context of language theory, Sapir’s model was reinterpreted to mean the contrast between the positivistic model of Bloomfieldian structuralism and the phenomenological model of Wilhelm von Humboldt. Many critics of the cultural relativism hypothesis have not understood this disparity and consequently attacked Sapir and Whorf for using the wrong metaphors, wrong similes and even mystical thinking (Miller, 1968).

The controversy between linguistic relativity and innate ideas frames the origins of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Immanuel Kant was interested in the ability of the human mind to bring order into experience (Cassirer, 1981). He reasoned that this was accomplished by the use of innate ideas which construct entities and constitute experience. This conclusion was arrived at by Kant after his encounter with the writing of David Hume by arguing that ideas are only possible through sense perceptions or synthetic a postiori propositions. Thus Kant endeavored to demonstrate that ideas can be innate, that they can exist independently of sensory input. His argument that innate ideas underlay the construction and constitution of experience was his pronouncement for the existence of a priori analytical propositions.

The next stage in the development which led to the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis can be found in the writings of Wilhem von Humboldt (Haym, 1856). Humboldt, unlike his contemporaries Herder and Hamann, accepted Kant’s theory of epistemology, but he also argued that language adds further objectivity to the theory of synthetic judgments.

In contrast to Kant, Humboldt brought with him another perspective on
innate ideas. Humboldt, it should be noted, was the first European to combine his knowledge of non-Indo-European languages with his philosophical approach. He was attracted to the notion of linguistic and cultural variability or diversity and argued that these great differences were due to the internal structure *innere Sprachformen* of their individual languages. These "inner speech forms" were not just labels for realities *Gegenstaende*, but they also were involved in the structuring of the world through these semantic units *Begriffe*. Thus, for Humboldt, language provided an objective source for universal ideas.

This had an effect on the work of Immanuel Kant. There were those who looked to all languages for evidence of the same innate ideas and there were those who viewed different languages as belonging to different systems of thought and consequently dissimilar in culture and linguistic form. The former group is involved with the search for linguistic universals (cf. Chomsky and Cartesian linguistics or the structuralism of Levy-Strauss) and the latter is concerned with the establishment and the verification of cultural relativity (cf. anthropological linguistics and structuralism of Levy-Bruhl). It is this latter tradition which the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis adheres to, and it is the former tradition which motivates the "expressibility hypothesis" of Fodor (1982).

**Cartesian Linguistics and Structural Systems**

Ferdinand de Saussure was trained as an historical linguist. It was from that tradition that he learned to view language as a system. But he differed from most of his contemporaries in that they defined systems in terms of concrete entities (*les mots*) which were traced diachronically into systems of protoforms. What Saussure (1916) did was to view a system itself diachronically. His was a Cartesian system in which the objects themselves were not posited as direct entities. It was, instead, a system which defined units by their relationship to other units. In other words, it was a mathematical system of relationships. The important question then becomes what is the cognitive status of such systems. Many of the structuralists who were influenced by Saussure adhered to the view that they were merely discovering linguistic systems. Implicit in their view was the Darwinian belief that language is a part of nature, a tool to assist humans in adapting to the environment. Consequently, language followed certain physiological laws. This view is concomitant with the processes of adaptation and assimilation which were later espoused by Jean Piaget (1954) in his biological model of genetic
epistemology (Phillips, 1969). It is this view of language as a self-contained system of forms which depict physical reality that foreshadows Bloomfieldian linguistics in America.

Even while taxonomic structuralism was emerging as the new paradigm in Europe, it did have a converse paradigm in semanticists such as Leo Weisgerber who claimed that cognition results from the interaction between man's outer and inner worlds. This was represented in the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt, Jost Trier (Miller 42) who represented this semantic focus attempted to study semantic fields Bedeutungsfeld, lexical fields Wortfeld and semantic space Begriffsfeld. It was this tradition which motivated anthropological research for the use of language in semantic domains (Doe, 1988).

Edward Sapir clearly differed from the mainstream of taxonomic structuralism and held views that were consistent with the neo-Humboldtian tradition. His work was consistent with the search for the innere Sprachformen underlying language expression and was concomitant with the Bedeutungsfeld theory of Jost Trier. This is evident in Sapir's article (Sapir qtd. in Mandelbaum 209) on the status of linguistics as a science:

Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. [...] The fact of the matter is that the 'real world' is a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group [...] The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached.

What is important about this excursion into the history of linguistic ideas is that the metaphors of language espoused by Sapir and Whorf were not the same as those advocated by taxonomic structuralists (Bloomfield, Hockett, Trager and Smith, etc.) or neo-structuralists (Chomsky, Akmajian, etc.). Although they pursued linguistic structures, they did so for different reasons. Thus they generated a different vocabulary and motives.

Metaphorical Structures

The concept of lexical domains was once situated in anthropology and reflected an outgrowth of Humboldtian linguistics in the phenomenological tradition of Trier (1932) and Weisgerber (1926). Now, however, psycholinguists and cognitive psychologists also conduct research on lexical space. The differences
between these two traditions are extensive. Anthropologists function within the context of cultural relativism as they are searching for a *posteriori* knowledge of conceptual and cultural categories. Psychologists, on the other hand, operate within the framework of neo-Kantian rationalism and they are searching for a *priori* cognitive categories, that is, universals of the mind.

Although the psychological model ruled out many significant anthropological issues, the path it followed has been quite informative. The research of De Valois and Jacobs (1968) in the neurophysiology of color vision is most interesting in that they noted that in the pathway between the eyes and the brain there are six types of cells. These response cells operate in pairs and fire at certain levels of stimulus to recognize various colors. This universal physiology of color recognition, however, does not deal with the concept of cultural saliency. In Japanese, for example, there was in the traditional Japanese lexicon no word for green. It was later added to the lexicon as *midori*. They had basic color/brightness terms for red *akai*, blue *aoi*, white *siroi*, and black *kuroi* but not green as such. Even today *aoi* still applies to green traffic lights, green mountains and ocean colors with all shades of blue/green. To simply claim as in the research of De Valois and Jacobs that the visual cells were firing beneath the threshold required for color recognition is unsatisfactory as it does not deal with the issue of cultural saliency. While *midori* could be explained in terms of the neurophysiology of perception it was not culturally relevant at the time, so it did not exist as a lexical category. The answer to this dichotomy lies within both paradigms and therein lies the paradox of Western thought: one deals with either universals or particulars.

When psychologists felt that they had demolished the neo-Humboldtian framework underlying the Sapir-Whorfian hypothesis, they immediately focused their research on the categories of the mind. There was a shift consequently in reasoning that no longer questioned whether or not categories were found by anthropologists to be culturally salient in a language but rather to what features were surmised by psychologists through experiment and logic to undergird the lexicon (Fillenbaum and Rappoport, 1973).

As was discussed above, scholars who approach language from a positivistic perspective distinguish between literal and metaphorical language. Samuel Levin (1977) specifically dealt with this issue within the context of Speech Act theory. He argued strongly for the literal interpretation of metaphor. In his discussion of conceptual space (Levin, *Metaphoric Worlds*, 28-29), for example, he noted that the words of a language stake out positions in subspaces in which each is defined by an intrinsic conceptual coherence. A sentence, he said, must be construed within the background
of its conceptual space. In other words, all metaphors are to be interpreted as literal within their own metaphorical or socially constructed worlds. This approach to language is phenomenological. It is reminiscent of the work of Husserl (1962) and is consistent with the work of Heidegger (1962) in his treatment of the conceptual worlds of the pre-Socratic philosophers. What all these philosophers noted is the fact that the interpretation of language is culturally and historically bound. Metaphors, Levin says, influence how we view the world and they determine the roles that we play in that world.

This is relevant to the issue of schema mentioned earlier. The schema generated from the underlying metaphoric patterns lead to the creation of plans (scripts, strategies) and themes (life goals, roles, biographical patterns). Schema also create scripts, episodic plots and formulae which are realized in situational scripts, social roles, personal scripts or traits and emerge as figurative language.

Some event or context in one’s experience can become the basis for an underlying schema. It need not specify that the experience has to be verbal or non-verbal. It can be both. That experience develops a provisional structure and this structure then organizes a semantic space of the experiences involved. Living in a family, for example provides an underlying model which finds exemplification in the metaphors we use, the kinds of metonymy employed, the types of synecdoche allowed and the forms of analogy used. It may be found in the verbal complexity of the honorific systems in Japanese, Korean or Thai but it is also found in the non-verbal patterns of behavioral respect, selection of clothing, body language and gestures, the uses of silence, and so on.

Hence, both verbal and non-verbal behavior are cognitively connected and the source of this synthesis is realized from the actual context of a lived-in culture from which we create our schema.

Anyone familiar with Asian languages would notice that the schema for the family in Asia is not concomitant with that in Europe. The problem is that positivistic claims about the innate semantic categories as a priori universals fail because it is a European culture-bound model. If we accept the fact of episodic memory then cultures will have different concepts of their subjective lexicon. That is, they have different models of semantic memory. It can be thus argued that the figures of speech which are part of the mainstream of Asian cultures and which are different from those in European thought are a result of the differences in underlying schema. Because different cultures employ different schema upon which to draw their models of symbolic realism, and because these models are expressed figuratively in language, it can be concluded that metaphors, along with other tropes, provide valuable
insight into the underpinnings of cultures, their structures, their values and their categorical saliences. Mark Johnson (1987) essentially summed up this framework in his argument that the body provides a significant role in creating meaning, in guiding imagination and in the development of reason. In other words, the body and our experience of it, becomes the schema for many natural metaphors found in languages, such as up and down, before and after, container and entity, movement and direction (leading to the schema of path, journey and destination).

The Contemporary Discourse on Ideas

This journey through the ideas on the epistemology of our knowledge, of the idea of Ideas, has brought us full-circle to the underlying metaphoric patterns which shape our perception about what an idea is. In order to examine cross-culturally the conceptual patterns in the contemporary discourse on IDEAS a data base of comparable sources in English and KANGAE in Japanese was made.

The concept of IDEAS here for this lexical data base must be understood in the broadest sense of the word ideas and its immediate associations. It refers to any word or phrase that is a synonym or an antonym as found in a thesaurus. After an initial survey of associated terms for this key concept, the data were collected from four types of sources in each language: (1) reference works such as thesauruses and dictionaries, (2) books on metaphorical expressions, (3) books on vocabulary building, and (4) books on linguistics and psychology. After all the expressions which focused on the expression of IDEAS/KANGAE were collated, the data were preliminarily classified into some underlying metaphoric categories a la Lakoff, such as IDEAS ARE FOOD/INGESTING, IDEAS ARE LIVING ORGANISMS, IDEAS ARE WEAPONS, etc. Once such underlying conceptual patterns were determined, the data were searched for further examples which would more clearly delineate the metaphoric patterns or lead to revisions. This search reflected the awareness of semantic fields and schema patterns found. The data included 209 token expressions from English and 298 from Japanese.

Some examples with the key vocabulary are highlighted in Table 1.
Table 1. Data examples related to the expression of IDEAS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example</th>
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<tr>
<td>His claims are indefensible.</td>
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<td>He shot down all their arguments.</td>
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<tr>
<td>You shouldn't swallow his theory whole.</td>
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<tr>
<td>He came up with a flood of ideas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>That concept was too deep to be readily understood.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Her suggestion gave birth to a variety of proposals.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The way to understand his proposal...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Her idea was brilliant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We couldn't grasp his idea.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

There have been, however, very few attempts at making any cross-cultural, cross-linguistic studies in cognitive linguistics, in particular in comparing underlying conceptual patterns. The issues of semantic space and the dependency of how schemas are created from and linked to the language and cultural experiences involved makes problematic the search for strict comparability. Nonetheless Mark Johnson (1987) and Horst Ruthrof (2000) argue in their studies that basic bodily experiences do shape how we express our cognitive perceptions into underlying metaphoric and schema patterns. While the construal of these basic patterns and their significance will inevitably be reshaped by the cultural and linguistic experiences which accrue to them, they do provide a foundation for cross-cultural comparisons. This suggests, of course the cross-roads of phenomenological and positivistic stances on the nature of what and how we understand things.

In a comparison of the underlying metaphoric patterns in English and Japanese, two strikingly different linguistic cultural discourses, eleven conceptual metaphoric patterns were determined in the form of IDEAS ARE XX following the conceptual pattern formulae of G. Lakoff, et al. The expressions in these patterns were subsequently categorized into four cross-cultural relationships: (A) similar in form and meaning, (B) similar in form but different in meaning, (C) different in form but similar in meaning, and (D) different in both form and meaning or miscellaneous items. Table 2 gives a list of the patterns.
Table 2. Underlying conceptual metaphor patterns in the data.

1. IDEAS ARE FOOD.
2. IDEAS ARE LIQUIDS.
3. ARGUMENT IS HUNTING.
4. ARGUMENT IS FIGHTING.
5. IDEAS ARE ORGANISMS.
6. THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS.
7. THEORIES ARE PATHS.
8. IDEAS ARE PICTURES.
9. UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING.
10. IDEAS ARE ENTITIES.
11. IDEAS ARE COMMODITIES.

In Table 3 the distribution of the occurrences of these patterns is summarized. Category A indicates that there is no substantive semantic conflict between English and Japanese in the use of the expressions on ideas and their metaphoric patterns. Percentages in each category indicate not only the occurrences but also by default the potential degree of misunderstanding both in perception of meaning but also in applied areas, such as translating between the two languages. A literal translation of the surface expressions faces the potential hazard of misunderstanding when the shared commonality is relatively low. Significantly only four of the patterns have a shared use in form and meaning of more than 50%, but only one of them, Pattern 8, has a very high degree of commonality (95%), IDEAS ARE PICTURES, where the visual field which most people share is least affected by cultural and linguistic variation. The absence of such visual experience is aptly described by Helen Keller (11) in which her understanding is grounded in bodily physical sensations.

When I think of hills, I think of the upward strength I tread upon. When water is the object of my thought, I feel the cool shock of the plunge and the quick yielding of the waves that crisp and curl and ripple about my body.

An overall examination of the distributions in Table 3 suggests much divergence in how the patterns are conceived, which would reflect the epistemological arguments in favor of culturally bound semantic space and the phenomenological nature of meaning. There is thus considerable potential for misperception in cross-cultural communication between English and Japanese in terms of the conceptualization of IDEAS focused
on here. The relatively high frequency of items in the miscellaneous category D further indicate the cultural specificity of the expressions molded out of these foundational underlying patterns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3 Distribution of English and Japanese Underlying Conceptual Patterns</th>
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<td>Relational Categories:</td>
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<td>Pattern 11</td>
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</table>

A representative sample of the expressions in each pattern and a discussion of the four categorical relationships of meaning and form follows:

IDEAS ARE FOOD #1

The expressions in category (A) can literally be translated from English into Japanese or vice versa. Fifty-three percent of the occurrences in this pattern fall in (A). Examples are the use of "to swallow" as in "You shouldn't swallow his argument whole," and the Japanese "nomu" (=swallow, drink) as in "hanasi o marunomi ni suru." (=to swallow the story as a whole) meaning "to believe in spite of any doubt."

There are few examples in (B) in this pattern, only 4%, but such can cause the readiest confusion in translation. The English verb "to cook up" as in "You'd better cook up a good story this time," and the Japanese "ryoori suru" (=to cook) as in "nanmon dai o ryoori suru" (=to cook a problem) are similar in form but significantly different in meaning. The English means "invent falsely" but the Japanese means "to solve problems" positively.

In category (C) we can compare the English "to warm over" as in "He never has any new ideas but just keeps giving us the same ones warmed over," with
the Japanese expression “niban-senzi” (=reused old tea leaves) as in “gaikoku eiga no niban senzi” (= The movie is a rehash <made from the old tea leaves> of foreign movies.) Both have a similar meaning of using the same ideas or arguments again. Only 12% of the data fall into this category in Pattern 1.

The data which did not fit into one of the three categorical relations above were placed in this miscellaneous category (D). A literal translation of these expressions with their highly cultural context associations could lead to confusion of meaning or the feeling of something being outright incomprehensible. An example from Japanese would be “ippai susuraseru” or as in “mesi/gohan o ippai kuwaseru” (=to treat/serve to a cup of wine/bowl of rice) but actually was used in context to mean “to cheat; to play a trick on someone.” Similarly the English expression “a hot potato” is used in context to refer to a problem which causes strong argument and is difficult to deal with. There are no such associations with eating potatoes in Japanese. About one third of pattern #1 data fall into category (D).

IDEAS ARE LIQUIDS #2

Category (A) 42%: examples are “fountain head,” “untapped springs,” “to flow,” “flood of ideas,” “deep ideas,” “to absorb ideas,” “to sink in” in English and “izumi” (=spring), “waki-agaru” (=to flow up and over), “nagare” (=flow), “ahure-deru” (=to flow out and over), “kozumi” (=flood), “hukamaru” (=to deepen), “sinto suru” (=permeate), “simi-wataru” (=to stain throughout) and “sinzyun suru” (=saturate) in Japanese.

Category (C) 32%: examples are “to throw cold water on” may be compared with the Japanese “mizu o asu” (=to pour water into) and “spring” with “komageru” with similar intent.

Category (D) 22%: examples are “reservoir of knowledge/ideas” or “be up the creek” (=to be in trouble) are examples with no Japanese counterpart; “uzu” (a whirlpool but used to mean “confusion” or “disorder”) or “gyoko suru” (=to solidify, meaning “to make an idea firm”) had no counter part in English.

ARGUMENT IS HUNTING #3

Category (A) 35%: “to trace” or “to hunt for” can be compared with “syooruyoo suru” (=to roam around in search of st.), “tadoru” (=pursue, follow), and
"oitumeru" (=drive into a corner, run down). There were no occurrences in category (B).

Category (C) 18%: examples are "to trace" can be compared with "saguru" (which literally means "to grope for or to search") or "kagi-tukeru" (="to smell out" or "to sniff").

Category (D) 22%: examples in English are "to bark up the wrong tree," "to beat about the bush," "a shot in the dark" and in Japanese "nigasu" as in expressions such as "minogasu" and "kikinogasu" ("nigasu" means literally "to set loose/off" or "let go").

ARGUMENT IS FIGHTING #4

In the data this pattern has aspects of (a) fighting in general, (b) fighting with guns, (c) fighting with knives, (d) unarmed fighting as in karate, judo, (e) fighting with swords, (f) fighting with spears, (g) fighting by throwing stones, (h) using smoke to hide oneself in fighting, and (i) ropes used for binding opponents in fighting. The English data lacks (d) to (i) and Japanese lacks (b) and (c). These variations are of course highly dependent on culturally specific contexts with the attendant semantic space issues.

Category (A) 8% only: examples are "to attack" which is comparable to "osou" and "to occupy" with "smyou suru." There were no occurrences in category (B). Category (C) 36%: examples are "to demolish" and "to wipe out" which may be compared to "tottimeru" and "kurusimeru"; "to shoot down" and "a parting shot" may be compared to "issi o mukiru," "butukeru" and "nage-au.

Category (D) with a high occurrence of 56% suggests that this pattern is particularly subject to culturally specific elaborations and consequent potential incomprehensibility. Examples from English are "a flash in the pan," "to cut into," and "a cutting remark"; examples from Japanese include "taiketsu suru" (=to stand face to face, meaning to "confront or have a showdown"), and "happo-husagari" (="all eight directions" are closed up, meaning "everything goes wrong or goes against a person").
IDEAS ARE LIVING ORGANISMS # 5

The data in this pattern include such aspects as (a) people, (b) plants, and (c) animals. The English data lack the use of aspect (c). In the case of (a) IDEAS are viewed as having the various stages of people’s lives, such as “to be pregnant with ideas,” “to father ideas,” “to give birth to ideas,” “to have a brainchild,” and “to adopt ideas.” There are death and life aspects such as “killing ideas” and “resurrecting” them. In addition, IDEAS may be viewed as parts of the human body. In Japanese the use of “myaku” (=veins), “hone” (=bones), “kosi” (=hips), and “kyuusyo” (=vitals) occurred but none of these were found in the English data.

In the use of plants, not only parts of plants but aspects of cultivation and farming are linked. Ideas can be fertile or barren. We “break new ground” and “plant the seeds (or ideas) in good soil.” The “seeds of ideas” may be deeply rooted in the soil, they may bud, they may come to flower and fruit, and ripen as fruit. Ideas may be referred to as roots, offshoots, vines and branches. In Japanese the use of animals to structure ideas is common, particularly the use of “kitune” (fox) and “tanuki” (badger), both iconic animals in the culture of Japan.

Category (A) 29%: examples are “to give birth to” with “umu”; “to live” with “ikiru”; “seeds” with “tane”; “branch,” “offshoot” with “siyoo”; “to come to fruition” with “mi o musubu” and “ketuzitu suru.” There were no occurrences in category (B).

Category (C) 28%: English examples “pregnant” and “fertile” may be compared to “umu” (to give birth); “barren” may be compared with “kosi-kudake” and “ryuusan”; “yomigaeru” with “to be brought back to life”.

Category (D) 43%: examples in English are “corpus,” “skin-deep,” “body” (meaning large amount of something), “grapevine,” and “soil” (meaning a place for growth or development); and from Japanese “kotu” (=bones, used to mean a secret or trick), “myaku-dokoro” (places in the body where the pulse can be felt, used to mean a “vital point”), “kosi o oru” (to break the hips, meaning to “interrupt”), “kama o kakeru” (to cut with a sickle, meaning to ask a leading question, to draw out, trick into confession), and “sippo o dasu” (to show one’s tail, meaning to reveal one’s true character or betray oneself, to give oneself away).
THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS #6

In both English and Japanese, establishing theories is expressed in terms of constructing buildings. Aspects of buildings such as the foundation and frame as well as whether the structure is firm or shaky and needs support or will fall apart are common in both languages. Category (A) 49%: examples "constructive" may be compared to "kenseru-tekita"; "shaky" with "yuragugia"; "to run into a brick wall" with "kabe ni butukero"; "key" and "unlock" with "kagi" and "kii-pointo" with the English "key point"; "in a maze" with "meikyuu-iri." There were no occurrences in category (B).

Category (C) 32%: examples "to construct" and "to build up" may be compared with "tumi-ageru"; "to hammer out" and "to open doors" with "kagi o nigruru"; "to make bricks into straw" with "saszyoo no rookaku." Category (D) 19%: examples from English include "a framework" and "frame of reference"; "to shore up," "to buttress," "to hammer in," "to hammer out," "to hammer at," and "to hit the nail on the head." Japanese examples include "hurui-wakeru."

THEORIES ARE PATHS #7

The metaphor of the PATH is used for conceptualizing THEORIES into schema, in terms of "directions," "destinations," and "guides." However, there is considerable divergence in how the metaphors are understood as Table 4 suggests.

Category (A) 39%: examples in English which are related to Japanese on the lexical as well as semantic frame are "way" and "avenue" with "mita" and "ikikata"; "direction" with "hoosin" and "hokkoo"; "to lead" and "to guide" with "mitibiku"; "to stumble into" with rumazuku." Category (B) 18%: the English expressions "to wander off" and "to make an excursion," meaning to investigate, examine or survey may be compared to the Japanese "arukimawaru" meaning to go about, "urotuku" meaning to struggle with (difficulties), and "samayou" meaning "to confuse."

Category (C) 14%: examples are the English terms "area," "province," "domain," and the Japanese term "hoomen" (= a direction/area faced). Category (D) 9%: some English examples are "to pave the way" meaning to make something easier or possible, or "a step" meaning to act or especially a series of actions which should produce a result; in Japanese the verbs "kuru" (=come), "tikazuku" (=approach) or "toori-sugiru" (=pass or go past) occur.
IDEAS ARE PICTURES #8

Of all the conceptual metaphoric patterns, this one alone had a very high degree of commonality in English and Japanese usage, that is 95% of the expressions fit into category (A). Examples are "to picture" with "egaku"; "color" with "iroai"; "to fade" with "sameru"; "to sketch in" or "to block in" with "tenbyou-suru" or "sobyoo-suru". The only example out of category (A) was one in (D), the English expression "to lend color to." This pattern is of course related to UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING which also had a high concurrence between English and Japanese.

UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING #9

This pattern has the second highest convergence of commonality between English and Japanese. It could be labeled as IDEAS ARE LIGHT SOURCES and as in the case of pattern #8, is based on the essential visual experiences of people in whatever culture. Seventy-six percent of the expressions fall into category (A). Examples include "point of view" with "kentai," "tatiba," "siten," "kanten," "me no tukedokoro," and "syooten"; "to focus on" with "syooten" and "pinto"; "angle" with "kakudo"; "blind spot" with "mooten"; "to view" with "miru"; "transparent" with "mie-suita".

Category (B) 6%: Even though the English "to see" is comparable to "miru" the denotations are different. The Japanese is also used to mean to consider, to regard, to think about. Category (C) 9%: "outlook" and "to get the whole picture" may be compared with "koosyo kara handan suru" which literally means "to judge from higher places." Category (D) 9%: there are several English examples such as "brilliant" and "bright" meaning "clever" as well as "opaque" meaning "hard to understand" which had no Japanese direct equivalents.

IDEAS ARE ENTITIES #10

This pattern also has a fairly high degree of commonality reflecting our basic human perception of objects, things about us. Category (A) was 53%. Examples are "to catch," "to seize," and "to grasp" which are directly related to the Japanese "tukamumu," "uketoru," and "haaku-suru."

Category (B) had 37% occurrences. For (B) the English "to have a good grip on" meaning to understand and the Japanese "niguru" meaning to take full
control of a secret in hand” illustrate the hazard of similarity of form and divergence in meaning. There were no occurrences in category (C). Category (D) 10%: there were two expressions in English “to hold” meaning “to express or to have one’s belief” and “to put an idea” meaning to express in words in a particularly exact way.

IDEAS ARE COMMODITIES #11

This pattern represents the third highest of the conceptual metaphors in terms of shared commonality between English and Japanese. IDEAS are not only expressed as entities in buying and selling but also various facets of the marketplace, such as storing, shelving, weighing and packaging. “Goods” have value and may also be “stolen.” Category (A) 60%: examples include “to retail” with “ukeuri suru”; “to weigh” and “weight” with “hakari ni kakeru” and “tenbin ni kakeru”; “to shelve” with “tana-age suru”; “to pilfer” and “to steal” with “nusumu” and “nusumi-dasu.”

Category (B) 12%: while the English “to buy” means “to believe” and “to sell” means “to persuade someone” in the discourse on ideas, the Japanese “uri-kotoba ni kaikotoba” (=sell and buy words) mean “to give tit for tat” or “to return like for like.” There were no occurrences in category (C). Category (D) 28%: examples in English are “marketplace of ideas,” “valuable,” “worthless,” “to put a price on,” and “to package” but in Japanese “zoo-suru,” which literally translated means “to own,” but is used to mean “to contain or involve”; “yunyuu-suru,” which literally means “to import,” is used to mean “to accept, adopt, or introduce.”

Implications

As the distributions in Table 3 illustrated, there are considerable divergences in most of the metaphoric patterns between English and Japanese, their use and interpretation, which indicate the need to consider the underlying conceptual metaphor that has generated the particular expression pattern in each case when translating or interpreting between languages. The pitfalls suggested in categories B, C, and D show the high degree of unpredictability as to when and where such divergences or the degree of commonality may occur. Of the 553 specific expressions which made up the data in the eleven conceptual metaphoric patterns, only 44% shared a commonality of form
and meaning between English and Japanese. Five of the eleven patterns had a commonality of more than 50% but only one (number 8) had a very high degree of commonality (95%).

Table 4 below also illustrates the potential hazard of translating or interpreting without taking into account the context of use of the vocabulary and their underlying conceptual metaphoric patterns. The table aligns the patterns according to the frequency of the total data and gives the percentage of commonality from category A. The implications for translation/interpretation are clear. The expression of IDEAS is necessarily linked to metaphoric language in their realization from abstractions into the specifics of our individual and shared experiences. Such experiential roots encompass the semantic space which is created in our discourses in each culture and in turn inform the use and interpretations we make of our experiences into metaphoric patterns, schema and various social scripts which in turn inform our social roles and perceptions. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argued for the experiential roots of such conceptual patterns in what they call orientation and ontological metaphors from which there are also constructed the culturally shaped patterns. While the orientational and ontological frames have fundamentally grounding in our universal experiences of space and movement, according to Lakoff, they nonetheless will still be interpreted in localized culturally specific experiences. These results raise the issues of our epistemologies of knowledge pointed out in the first parts of this paper: the creation of mental space in lexical representations in the networks of semantic formulations. The phenomenological nature of meaning with the foundational experiences framing them bring us back to the iconic and cultural models created to which we are indebted to realize our understanding.

The conflict in epistemologies which have historically shaped our discourses in the sciences and humanities in positivistic or phenomenological modes can be seen in the diversity of conceptualization patterns and schema which are used to bring order into our experiences. While there are shared foundational facts of experience in the recognition of our bodies, space and movement, how these experiences are ordered into semantic spaces themselves will lead to new creations out of the legacies of memory shared with others in our communities of communication.
Table 4. Frequency of Conceptual Metaphoric Patterns their Commonality.

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<th>Patterns</th>
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Data Sources:


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